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INTRODUCTION

The recent initialing of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) by the trade ministers of Canada, Mexico, and the United
States is a symbolic event in the continued globalization of the world
economy that represents the successful conclusion of over fourteen
months of formal negotiation among the three countries. Mexico and
the United States have been engaged in negotiations on an informal
basis for more than two years, ever since President Bush and President Salinas de Gortari issued a joint statement endorsing the idea of
a bilateral agreement in June 1990.1 Although the initialing is legally
insignificant since each of the countries must formally ratify the
* B.A., with highest honors, University of Texas; J.D., St. Mary's University, San
Antonio. Partner, Strasberger & Price, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas. The author acknowledges, with
special thanks, the assistance given by Holly Pefia in the preparation of this article.
1. OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NORTH AMERICAN
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT FACT SHEET 2 (Aug. 12, 1992).
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NAFTA for it to take effect, the initialing ceremony brings the countries one step closer to a new era for North American trading relationships. The United States and Canada forged the Canada-United
States Free Trade Agreement almost four years ago. The trilateral
NAFTA is truly revolutionary because of the participation of Mexico.
Interestingly, many acknowledge Mexico as the instigator of the
entire initiative. At the initialing ceremony, Prime Minister Brian
Mulroney of Canada recognized President Salinas for his "commitment to opening up and modernizing [the] country's economy and to'2
harnessing its huge potential [which] first inspired this initiative."
Credit is certainly due Mexico. Mexico's participation in the
NAFTA is the direct result of the current administration's commitment to open up and modernize Mexico's economy as quickly as possible. Under President Salinas, Mexico has divested over half of the
businesses previously owned or operated by the government, tempered restrictions on foreign investment, reformed import policies, increased protection of industrial property, and abolished impediments
to the transfer of technology. These reforms have contributed to the
demise of Mexico's closed, protected economy and have created a
gateway into Mexico that the NAFTA will enhance.
Although most of the major structural changes in Mexico's economy have taken place in the past four years under the Salinas administration, Mexico embarked on its modernization and reform path
with its accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) in 1987. 3 Prior to its accession, Mexico was the thirteenth
largest economy in the world and the largest market economy not a
part of the GATT.4 Mexico's accession to the GATT was indeed an
historical event. Moreover, the history behind Mexico's accession
sheds some light on Mexico's progression toward improved bilateral
trade relations with the United States, culminating in the initialled
NAFTA text.
The NAFTA, like all historic events, raises questions as to its consequences. Upon implementation, the NAFTA will establish the larg2. Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, Address at the Initialing Ceremony for the North
American Free Trade Agreement (Oct. 7, 1992).
3. Richard D. English, The Mexican Accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J., 339, 340 (1988).
4. Review of Trade and Investment Liberalization Measures by Mexico and Prospects for
Future United States-Mexican Relations, USITC Pub. 2275, Inv. No. 332-282, at 2-1 (Apr.

1990).
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est free-trade zone in the world: comprising 360 million people, the
North American market is larger than the European Community and
encompasses over 5,000 miles of territory.5 Like the European Community's announcement of its intention to establish a common market
by the end of 1992, the symbolic initialing ceremony signaling the end
of the NAFTA negotiations has raised concerns regarding the relationship between such regional trading relationships and the multilateral trading system established by the GATT, to which all
participants in the NAFTA are contracting parties.
Part II of this article addresses Mexico's progression toward accession to the GATT. Part III provides an overview of the various stages
in improved bilateral trade relations between the United States and
Mexico and the negotiations in the multilateral Uruguay Round, all
of which laid the foundation for the NAFTA. Finally, Part IV addresses the relationship of the NAFTA and the GATT in light of
their probable coexistence in the future, focusing on the issue of dispute resolution.
II.

MEXICO AND THE

GATT

Mexico's accession to the GATT marked a departure from protectionist economic policies of the past and symbolized a commitment to
continued liberalization of trade in the future.' For decades, Mexico
obstructed free trade. Indeed, Mexico built barriers to trade while its
trading partners launched the GATT to tear down such obstacles and
to liberalize trade among themselves. Mexico maintained its independence from the world-trading system for many years, finally joining
the GATT almost forty years after it was opened for signature.
"Since the formation of the General Agreement was strongly influenced by the United States

. .

., and since many of the provisions of

the General Agreement were modeled after the terms of a Reciprocal
Trade Agreement with Mexico, Mexico's failure to join was richly
ironic, and yet completely understandable in light of Mexico's independent foreign policy, which eschews any hint of influence by the
United States." 7
5. President George Bush, Address at the Initialing Ceremony for the North American
Free Trade Agreement (Oct. 7, 1992).
6. Richard D. English, The Mexican Accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 339, 340 (1988).

7. Id. at 367.
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What Is the GATT?

In order to understand Mexico's apprehension towards joining the
GATT, it is essential to understand what is the GATT. The GATT,
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,' was established by the
United States and seven other major trading partners in 1947 and
made effective January 1, 1948. 9 In fact, "[t]oday, almost all of the
trading nations of the free world, accounting for over four-fifths of the
world's trade, have adhered to the GATT." 10 The primary document
is the "General Agreement." Each party applies the document either
through the "Protocol of Provisional Application" or the subsequent
"Protocol of Accession." The GATT is therefore a set of documents
rather than one single document.II
While the GATT may refer to the treaty as established by a set of
documents, it may also refer to the organization consisting of the
group of contracting parties to the treaty. In sum, the GATT may
refer to the treaty as documented, to the contracting parties as a
group, or to both as a single concept. 12 The GATT is the framework
that establishes the parameters for the trading policies and trading
activities of its contracting parties. 13 The GATT freezes tariffs at
agreed levels and sets forth certain international trading rules including the "most-favored-nation principle," which requires each contracting party to afford every other country the lowest rates available
to the products of any country. 14 In theory, the GATT is merely an
agreement among the contracting parties to meet for discussions,
whether those meetings be to conduct multilateral trade negotiations
or to resolve disputes. The contracting parties have completed seven
rounds of multilateral tariff negotiations, and the eighth round, the
Uruguay Round, is still underway.
8. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT], openedfor signature Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. Part 5, T.I.A.S. 1700, reprinted in International Trade Agreements, INT'L TRADE REP.
75:0801-0828 (BNA 1987).
9. International Trade Agreements, INT'L TRADE REP. 75:0101 (BNA 1991).
10. Id.
11. JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 59 (The Bobbs-Merrill
Company, Inc. 1969).
12. Richard D. English, The Mexican Accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 339, 340-41 (1988).
13. Id.
14. See International Trade Agreements, INT'L TRADE REP. 75:0101 (BNA 1991) (explaining scope and function of GATT).
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B. Mexico's Protectionist Trade Regime
From 1940 to 1970, Mexico employed an import-substitution industrialization model that led to the development of one of the most
protected economies in Latin America and created a burdensome bureaucracy to control foreign trade through import licenses, tariffs, tax
concessions, official prices, and a protracted, case-by-case approval
system."5 Mexico was in the midst of building these protective walls
around its economy when the GATT was created in the mid-1940s.
Mexico protected its domestic industrialization efforts during the
1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, which ironically resulted in a flow of foreign
resources into Mexico but excluded foreign competition. Consequently, the industrial sector, having little incentive to invest in itself,
became dangerously dependent on technological and economic resources from foreign participants. 16 The Mexican government began
to realize that its future growth depended, to a large degree, on active
participation in international trade, a goal that would require
17
profound policy changes in Mexico.
In January 1979, Mexico expressed an interest in initiating negotiations for accession to the GATT. 8 The working party assigned to
investigate Mexico's accession to the GATT reached a positive conclusion. 19 For political and economic reasons, however, President L6pez Portillo announced in March 1980 that Mexico would delay its
entry into the GATT.2 ° Several representative political groups had
15. Review of Trade and Investment Liberalization Measures by Mexico and Prospects
for Future United States-Mexican Relations, USITC Pub. 2275, Inv. No. 332-282, at 2-1 (Apr.
1990); see John M. Vernon & Enrique A. Gonzlez Calvillo, Planningfor Free Trade: Taking
Advantage of the Transition, 23 ST. MARY'S L.J. 673, 678 (1992) (discussing effects of "import
substitution" and "industrial integration").
16. John M. Vernon & Enrique Gonzlez Calvillo, Planningfor Free Trade: Taking Advantage of the Transition, 23 ST. MARY'S L.J. 673, 686 (1992).
17. Richard D. English, The Mexican Accession to the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and
Trade, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 339, 367-68 (1988).
18. Id. at 368. In the past, Mexico had been present as an observer at various GATT
meetings and had participated in the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations where it
received over 1,000 tariff concessions worth $2.5 billion, but Mexico had never before expressed an interest in becoming a contracting party to the GATT. Review of Trade and Investment Liberalization Measures by Mexico and Prospects for Future United States-Mexican
Relations, USITC Pub. 2275, Inv. No. 332-282, at 2-1 (Apr. 1990); Richard D. English, The
Mexican Accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 339,
367-68 (1988).
19. Richard D. English, The Mexican Accession to the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and
Trade, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 339, 368 (1988).
20. Review of Trade and Investment Liberalization Measures by Mexico and Prospects

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

5

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 24 [2022], No. 3, Art. 3

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 24:717

expressed opposition to Mexico's accession to the GATT. Moreover,
with rising oil prices sustaining the Mexican economy, the Mexican
government did not consider liberalization of trade economically
necessary. 2 '
C.

Mexico's Accession to the GATT
Less than two years later, the bottom fell out of the economy in

Mexico.22 Mexico faced enormous economic difficulties:

The burden of servicing the external debt, the fall in the prices of commodities, especially of oil, and the proliferation of protectionist barriers
had brought about the most severe external-sector crisis in the country's
modem history. For Mexico, the collapse of the oil market meant a loss
on the order of 7-8 billion dollars per annum which represented approximately one-third of its export earnings and more than 12 percent of its
tax revenue.2 3
In exploring long-term solutions to its economic problems, Mexico
determined that trade reform was critical to its prosperity. On November 26, 1985, President Miguel de la Madrid announced that
Mexico would reapply for membership in the GATT. 24 Mexico acceded to the GATT in August 1986 after a somewhat expedited process influenced by the many GATT members that wanted Mexico to
become a party to the agreement. 2 5
for Future United States-Mexican Relations, USITC Pub. 2275, Inv. No. 332-282, at 2-1 (Apr.
1990); Richard D. English, The Mexican Accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 339, 368 (1988).
21. Review of Trade and Investment Liberalization Measures by Mexico and Prospects
for Future United States-Mexican Relations, USITC Pub. 2275, Inv. No. 332-282, at 2-1 (Apr.
1990).
22. Id. Mexico's economic problems were directly related to the sudden and dramatic
drop in the price of oil in mid-1981. Id.
23. See Richard D. English, The Mexican Accession to the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs
and Trade, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 339, 368 (1988) (quoting Report of the Working Party on the
Accession of Mexico, para. 4, GATT Doc. L/6010, BISD, 33d Supp. 57, 59 (1987)).
24. Review of Trade and Investment Liberalization Measures by Mexico and Prospects
for Future United States-Mexican Relations, USITC Pub. 2275, Inv. No. 332-282, at 2-1 (Apr.
1990). To this day, President de la Madrid is given much of the credit for Mexico's accession
to the GATT, considering its importance to the deregulation in the area of trade as well as
other areas of the Mexican economy. See John M. Vernon & Enrique Gonzlez Calvillo, Planning for Free Trade: Taking Advantage of the Transition, 23 ST. MARY'S L.J. 673, 681-82
(1992) (noting that under President de la Madrid, Mexico took its first steps towards opening
its economy).
25. Review of Trade and Investment Liberalization Measures by Mexico and Prospects
for Future United States-Mexican Relations, USITC Pub. 2275, Inv. No. 332-282, at 2-1 (Apr.
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Generally, when a country seeks admission to the GATT,"a working party is appointed to examine the application of accession and to
submit to the GATT Council recommendations for the accession."26
However, after just four sessions, which focused primarily on Mexico's foreign-trade laws, the working party recommended that Mexico
be invited to accede to the GATT. Following this recommendation,

the contracting parties decided on July 18, 1986, to allow Mexico to
accede to the GATT. Mexico subsequently signed the protocol of accession, which became effective on August 24, 1986, making Mexico
the ninety-second contracting party to the GATT.2 7
D.

Mexico in the GA TT

Because Mexico acceded to the GATT as a developing country, it

was eligible for special treatment accorded such countries in terms of
compliance with GATT rules. 28 By acceding to the GATT, Mexico
became eligible for all benefits resulting from the application of the
GATT's basic principles, such as the most-favored-nation principle
which contracting parties are bound to respect. 29 However, the contracting parties did not compel Mexico in certain circumstances to
comply strictly with its obligations under the basic GATT principles.
For example, Mexico was allowed to maintain its sovereignty over
natural resources as provided by the Mexican Constitution, and Mexico employed certain export restrictions designed to conserve natural

1990). Mexico's relatively smooth accession is partly attributable to the groundwork laid by
the bilateral trade agreements that Mexico had already made with the United States and eight
developed nations and groups. Richard D. English, The Mexican Accession to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 339, 368 (1988).
26. Review of Trade and Investment Liberalization Measures by Mexico and Prospects
for Future United States-Mexican Relations, USITC Pub. 2275, Inv. No. 332-282, at 2-1 (Apr.
1990).
27. Id.; Richard D. English, The Mexican Accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 339, 369 (1988).
28. Review of Trade and Investment Liberalization Measures by Mexico and Prospects
for Future United States-Mexican Relations, USITC Pub. 2275, Inv. No. 332-282, at 2-1 (Apr.
1990). For example, Mexico could continue to exercise sovereignty over its natural resources.
Id.; see Richard D. English, The Mexican Accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 339, 369 (1988) (noting that Mexico's requirements for compliance
are less stringent owing to its status as a developing country).
29. For a complete discussion of the principles underlying GATT, and Mexico's accession pursuant to such principles, see generally Richard D. English, The Mexican Accession to
the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 339, 341-91 (1988) (outlining
underlying GATT principles and their application to Mexico's accession).
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resources for social and development needs. 30 Naturally, because
"Mexico would benefit immediately from Most-Favored-Nation treatment of its exports... it should be expected that Mexico would offer
substantial tariff reductions and concessions as part of its accession.... "31 Mexico agreed to bind its entire tariff schedule, including
industrial and agricultural products, to a 50% maximum rate as part
of its accession to the GATT.3 2 Mexico agreed to further reduce tariffs on a majority of tariff classification headings to levels between 20
and 50% over a 30-month period.3 3
In lieu of protection in the form of tariffs, Mexico would protect
development programs in nine sectors using import permits. Moreover, tariff surtaxes could be applied on a temporary basis as necessary to protect such programs for a period not to exceed eight years.
Such surtaxes were not to exceed 50% of the tariff rate established for
a particular product and were to be reduced to zero in 8 years.34 Such
surtaxes would be used to give certain sectors time for adjustment,
and, as Mexico assured the working party that studied its accession to
the GATT, would be the exception and not the rule.3 5
The use of an official pricing system violates the customs-valuation

30. Review of Trade and Investment Liberalization Measures by Mexico and Prospects
for Future United States-Mexican Relations, USITC Pub. 2275, Inv. No. 332-282, at 2-1 (Apr.
1990). Mexico was also permitted to maintain certain protections for agriculture pursuant to
its economic and social policies. Id.
31. Richard D. English, The Mexican Accession to the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and
Trade, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 339, 373 (1988).
32. Review of Trade and Investment Liberalization Measures by Mexico and Prospects
for Future United States-Mexican Relations, USITC Pub. 2275, Inv. No. 332-282, at 2-1 (Apr.
1990); Richard D. English, The Mexican Accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 339, 373 (1988). Mexico had already unilaterally established a 50%
maximum tariff rate. Review of Trade and Investment Liberalization Measures by Mexico and
Prospects for Future United States-Mexican Relations, USITC Pub. 2275, Inv. No. 332-282, at
2-1 (Apr. 1990); Richard D. English, The Mexican Accession to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 339, 373-74 (1988).
33. Review of Trade and Investment Liberalization Measures by Mexico and Prospects
for Future United States-Mexican Relations, USITC Pub. 2275, Inv. No. 332-282, at 2-1 (Apr.
1990); Richard D. English, The Mexican Accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 339, 373 (1988).
34. Review of Trade and Investment Liberalization Measures by Mexico and Prospects
for Future United States-Mexican Relations, USITC Pub. 2275, Inv. No. 332-282, at 2-2 (Apr.
1990); Richard D. English, The Mexican Accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 339, 373 (1988).
35. See Richard D. English, The Mexican Accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 339, 373 (1988) (explaining transitional nature of tariff
surtaxes).
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provision of the GATT. Thus, the efficacy of Mexico's tariff concessions was tied to Mexico's willingness to forgo its official pricing system. While Mexico's system violated the letter as well as the spirit of
the GATT, the contracting parties did not require Mexico to abandon
the system because the system was authorized by law existing at the
time Mexico acceded to the GATT.36 However, Mexico's adoption of
the GATT's antidumping and countervailing duty remedies obviated

the need for official prices.3 7 Mexico ultimately agreed that by the
end of 1987 it would eliminate its official pricing system and bring its
customs-valuation practices into conformity with the GATT's methodology. Accordingly, Mexico signed the Tokyo Round Customs
Valuation Code in July 1987.38

In addition to Mexico's significant tariff concessions, Mexico's willingness to reduce or to align non-tariff barriers was crucial to Mex-

ico's accession to the GATT because these barriers, such as import
permits and import quotas, had historically been Mexico's primary

method for protecting domestic industry. 39 Prior to accession, Mexico indicated that it would negotiate the eventual elimination of nontariff barriers with the contracting parties. Mexico also stated that it
would continue to substitute tariff protection for import permits to
the extent possible. Moreover, any non-tariff barriers would be justified pursuant to the applicable GATT provisions. To this effect, Mexico signed the Import Licensing Procedures Code in July 1987, just
six months after its accession to the GATT. 4°

As mentioned earlier, Mexico adopted the GATT's antidumping
and countervailing duty remedies with the enactment of its Foreign
36. Id. at 376. Mexico was not required to abolish its pricing system because of provisions in the GATT and the Protocol of Provisional Application that provide that the relevant
provisions apply only to the extent that they are not inconsistent with existing law. The pricing system that existed when Mexico acceded fell within the exception. Id.
37. Id.
38. Review of Trade and Investment Liberalization Measures by Mexico and Prospects
for Future United States-Mexican Relations, USITC Pub. 2275, Inv. No. 332-282, at 2-2,
(Apr. 1990); Richard D. English, The Mexican Accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 339, 376 (1988).
39. Richard D. English, The Mexican Accession to the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and
Trade, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 339, 378 (1988).
40. Review of Trade and Investment Liberalization Measures by Mexico and Prospects
for Future United States-Mexican Relations, USITC Pub. 2275, Inv. No. 332-282, at 2-2 (Apr.
1990); Richard D. English, The Mexican Accession to the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and
Trade, 23 TEx. INT'L L.J. 339, 379 (1988).
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Trade Law in 1986.41 While the Mexican law does not expressly apply the standards for assessing injury contained in the GATT provisions, Mexico assured the working party prior to accession that it
would apply GATT definitions and concepts with respect to GATT
contracting parties.42 Mexico signed the Antidumping Code of the
Tokyo Round in July 1987.11
Of the five Tokyo Round codes, Mexico has become a signatory to
four: licensing, customs valuation, antidumping, and standards.
Although Mexico has not become a signatory to the Subsidies Code,
Mexico and the United States operate under an important bilateral
understanding in this area." This understanding was important to
improved bilateral trade relations between the two countries. Mexico
has expressed its intention to delay its decision on the Subsidies Code
until the end of the Uruguay Round.45
III.

TRANSITION TO THE

NAFTA

Many would say that Mexico's participation in the NAFTA is a
consequence, although not an inevitable one, of Mexico's trade-liberalization initiatives originating with its accession to the GATT. At
the very least, Mexico's accession to the GATT was a catalyst for
improved trade relations with its major trading partners and particularly helpful for bilateral trade relations between Mexico and the
United States. After Mexico's accession to the GATT, Mexico and
the United States negotiated important bilateral trade understandings.
These understandings were critical points in the road to a North
American free-trade area. Moreover, the trade issues discussed with
respect to these understandings are those under discussion multilaterally in the current Uruguay round of negotiations. These bilateral
41. Ley Reglamentaria del Articulo 131 de la Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos
Mexicanos en Materia de Comercio Exterior, D.O., Jan. 13, 1986, at 30-37.
42. Richard D. English, The Mexican Accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 339, 384 (1988).

43. Review of Trade and Investment Liberalization Measures by Mexico and Prospects
for Future United States-Mexican Relations, USITC Pub. 2275, Inv. No. 332-282, at 2-2 (Apr.
1990); Richard D. English, The Mexican Accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 339, 379 (1988).
44. In 1985, prior to Mexico's accession to the GATT, Mexico signed an understanding
with the United States regarding subsidies and countervailing duties in 1985. Review of Trade
and Investment Liberalization Measures by Mexico and Prospects for Future United StatesMexican Relations, USITC Pub. 2275, Inv. No. 332-282, at 2-3 (Apr. 1990).
45. Id.
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and multilateral negotiations, which had already raised and addressed
the various positions relative to contentious trade issues, laid the
groundwork for the NAFTA.
A.

1987 United States-Mexico Bilateral Framework Understanding

The United States and Mexico began bilateral trade negotiations in
the same year that Mexico reapplied to the GATT. These negotiations culminated on November 6, 1987 with the Framework of Principles and Procedures for Consultation Regarding Trade and
Investment Relations (1987 Understanding). 46 The 1987 Understanding marked a milestone in improved bilateral economic relations between Mexico and the United States.4 7
The [U]nderstanding emphasized the importance of liberalized trade
between the two countries .... In particular, it highlighted the need to
eliminate non-tariff barriers, the detrimental effects of protectionism,
the impact of export earnings on the ability of Mexico to meet its foreign debt obligations, the role the GATT played in the bilateral trade
relationship, and the increased significance of services in both
countries.4 8

The most significant aspect of the 1987 Understanding was the provision for a consultative mechanism to foster greater communication
between the countries on trade problems. The 1987 Understanding
systematized and facilitated discussion and interaction between the
countries by providing a mechanism for consultation on trade
problems, resolution of disputes, and negotiation regarding the removal or reduction of trade barriers. The 1987 understanding also
required that consultation take place within thirty days after a request
by either country. If an issue was not resolved within thirty days,
either country had the option to resort to other methods of dispute
resolution, including the GATT's dispute resolution procedures.49
United States and Mexican officials held four consultations and
three plenary sessions under the 1987 Understanding's framework for
a year and a half starting January 1988. The representatives of each
46. Review of Trade and Investment Liberalization Measures by Mexico and Prospects
for Future United States-Mexican Relations, USITC Pub. 2275, Inv. No. 332-282, at 2-3 (Apr.
1990).
47. Prior to this understanding, Mexico and the United States had no framework to govern commercial relations between the two countries. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 2-4.
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country addressed numerous issues in these sessions. 50 In August
1988, the two countries established working groups to permit less formal, ongoing negotiations on a number of contentious trade and investment issues.5 ' A result of these efforts under the 1987
52
Understanding was agreement on two sectoral trade accords.
B.

1989 UnderstandingRegarding Trade and Investment
Facilitation Talks

The United States and Mexico discussed many important issues
under the 1987 Understanding, and, indeed, both the NAFTA text
and the current GATT negotiations include many of the same issues.
The 1987 Understanding was important to improved bilateral trade
relations between the United States and Mexico; however, the Understanding Between the Government of the United Mexican States and
the Government of the United States of America Regarding Trade
and Investment Facilitation Talks, signed on October 3, 1989 by Mexico and the United States (1989 Understanding), is perhaps more directly significant.

53

In contrast to the 1987 Understanding which, merely established a
mechanism for addressing problems, the 1989 Understanding set up a
mechanism for negotiating the expansion of trade and investment opportunities.54 Additionally, the 1989 Understanding called for negotiations on a sectoral as well as cross-sectoral basis, including services,
intellectual property rights, investment opportunities, distribution
problems, and tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. 55 Moreover, the
1989 Understanding established a novel approach for gathering, compiling, and reviewing the information necessary to conduct such nego50. Many of these issues arose from another significant feature of the 1987 Understanding, its "Immediate Action Agenda" which called for prompt negotiations on issues such as
textiles, agriculture, investment matters, services, technology transfer and intellectual property
rights protection. Review of Trade and Investment Liberalization Measures by Mexico and
Prospects for Future United States-Mexican Relations, USITC Pub. 2275, Inv. No. 332-282, at
2-3 to 2-4 (Apr. 1990).
51. Id. at 2-4.
52. The first accord, signed in late 1987, dealt with two sectors, steel and alcoholic beverages. The second, signed in February 1988, addressed textile trade. Id. at 2-5.
53. See Review of Trade and Investment Liberalization Measures by Mexico and Prospects for Future United States-Mexican Relations, USITC Pub. 2275, Inv. No. 332-282, at 2-6
(Apr. 1990) (detailing significance of 1989 Understanding).
54. Id.
55. Id.
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tiations. The 1989 Understanding provided for the creation of binational teams to perform these tasks rather than the national teams
which each country had used in the past. 6 The thought was that this
methodology would "facilitate a resolution of issues before negotiations [were even] called to the table."' "5 Finally, the 1989 Understanding established a time frame for successive negotiations which served
to press the signatories to address the issues.5
C.

The Uruguay Round

Meanwhile, as Mexico's important bilateral trade relations improved dramatically, multilateral trade negotiations under the GATT
proceeded within the Uruguay Round, launched in Punta del Este,
Uruguay, in September 1986.'9 The GATT presently has over one
hundred contracting parties. The agenda for the Uruguay Round includes many of the issues that Mexico and the United States addressed bilaterally in reaching the 1987 and 1989 Understandings
discussed above, including services, investment, intellectual property
rights, textiles, and agriculture. The Uruguay Round has passed its
projected 1990 conclusion dateY° Although the Round has made progress in several areas, it is presently at a stalemate over issues related
primarily to agricultural subsidies, with the United States and the European Community being the parties at odds.6 1
With the Uruguay Round at a standstill and the NAFTA proceeding to ratification, some commentators question how the probable
NAFTA will affect the process of the Uruguay Round negotiations.
The reaction of GATT officials to the NAFTA has been positive.
"The Secretariat of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

56. Id.
57. Review of Trade and Investment Liberalization Measures by Mexico and Prospects
for Future United States-Mexican Relations, USITC Pub. 2275, Inv. No. 332-282,, Inv. No.
332-282, at 2-6 (Apr. 1990) (quoting Journalof Commerce, Nov. 8, 1989).
58. Review of Trade and Investment Liberalization Measures by Mexico and Prospects
for Future United States-Mexican Relations, USITC, Pub. 2275, Inv. No. 332-282,, Inv. No.
332-282, at 2-6 (Apr. 1990).
59. Review of Trade and Investment Liberalization Measures by Mexico and Prospects
for Future United States-Mexican Relations, USITC Pub. 2275, Inv. No. 332-282,, Inv. No.
332-282, at 2-1 (Apr. 1990).
60. International Trade Agreements, INT'L TRADE REP. 75:0103 (BNA 1991).
61. ProposedNorth American Trade Area Does Not Threaten GATT, Dunkel Says, INT'L
TRADE DAILY (BNA), Aug. 24, 1992 (quoting GATT Director General, Arthur Dunkel, who
characterized Uruguay Round as being in "a deeply disappointing situation of deadlock").
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hailed conclusion of the North American Free Trade Agreement...
as an example of the type of international trade pact which GATT
itself is seeking to promote."62 According to the GATT officials, the
NAFTA is an example of the application of Article 24 of the GATT,
which allows contracting parties to establish free-trade agreements
among themselves under certain criteria. 63 Some commentators believe that the NAFTA may foster the conclusion of the multilateral
negotiations, but others believe it will prove to be a hindrance. Several delegates to the Uruguay Round have said that "NAFTA is an
example of how regional trade pacts can be more effective than a
globe-girdling negotiation of the type envisaged by the Uruguay
Round. '64 Indeed, some predict the completion of numerous other
regional trade pacts that will make the multilateral system under
GATT redundant.65
Despite its critics, all parties to the NAFTA have continued to express their commitment to a successful conclusion of the multilateral
talks.66 President Bush expressed his wish to conclude multilateral
negotiations before the end of 1992.67 It is quite possible that United
States trade negotiators plan to use the NAFTA as one more chip on
the table in their efforts to resolve the stalemate with the European
Community over agricultural subsidies.
IV. THE NAFTA

AND THE

GATT

IN EFFECT

Assuming that all three countries ratify the NAFTA and that the
contracting parties to the GATT reach a successful conclusion to the
Uruguay Round, answers to the many questions regarding the interplay of regional trade agreements and the multilateral trading system
under the GATT will be forthcoming sometime after January 1, 1994,
62. GATT Secretariat Lauds Conclusion of North American Free Trade Pact, INT'L
(BNA), Aug. 13, 1992.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. President George Bush, Address at the Initialing Ceremony for the North American
Free Trade Agreement (Oct. 7, 1992); Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, Address at the Initialing Ceremony for the North American Free Trade Agreement (Oct. 7, 1992); President Carlos
Salinas de Gortari, Address at the Initialing Ceremony for the North American Free Trade
Agreement (Oct. 7, 1992).
67. See Bush Administration Hopeful of GATT "Breakthrough", UPI, Oct. 7, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (noting President Bush's wish to achieve GATT accord before presidential election).
TRADE DAILY
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the date on which NAFTA is scheduled to come into force.6" At least
the propriety of a North American regional trade agreement in general is unquestionable. As mentioned earlier, Article 24 of the GATT
specifically authorizes regional trade agreements. 69 The primary concern among commentators is, however, the consistency of the two
trade agreements.
The initialed NAFTA text attempts to foreclose any problems related to the interplay of the NAFTA and the GATT by providing
that the NAFTA generally takes priority over other agreements to the
extent a conflict exists. 70 Nevertheless, the NAFTA and the GATT
are not separable. The parties to the NAFTA remain contracting
parties to the GATT. Indeed, the NAFTA text makes reference to
the GATT in five different provisions. Of these five provisions, perhaps the most important is the article on the dispute resolution forum
selection. 71 This provision allows the complaining party to choose a
forum under the NAFTA or the appropriate forum under the GATT
if a dispute could be brought under either agreement. If the third
NAFTA party wishes to bring the same case in the forum other than
that chosen by the complaining party, the two complaining parties
will consult in an attempt to reach agreement on the forum. If the
complaining parties cannot agree on the forum, the NAFTA forum is
the preferable one.72 Once the parties select the forum, they cannot
bring the case in the other forum.73 A complaining party's choice of
forum will depend on its assessment of the procedural as well as substantive amenability of the two choices. A determination as to substantive amenability is necessarily fact-bound, with at least as many
possibilities as there are chapters in the initialed NAFTA text.
Although analysis of a hypothetical party's substantive preference for
either the NAFTA or the GATT forum is beyond the scope of this
article, the procedural determination is not.
A dispute resolution procedure is set out primarily in one chapter
68. North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA], Aug. 12, 1992, U.S.-Mex.-Can.,
Ch. 22, art. 2203 (text revised Sept. 6, 1992).
69. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT], openedfor signature Oct. 30, 1947,
art. 24, 61 Stat. Part 5, T.I.A.S. 1700, reprinted in International Trade Agreements, INT'L
TRADE REP. 75:0815-0816 (BNA 1987).
70. NAFTA ch. 1, art. 103.
71. See id. ch. 20, art. 2005, § 1 (providing for settlement negotiations under either
GATT or NAFTA Forum).
72. Id. ch. 20, art. 2005, § 2.
73. Id. ch. 20, art. 2005, § 5.
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of the NAFTA.74 The NAFTA provides that a complaining party
may request to have the disputed matter heard by an arbitral panel. 7,
The third country may join as a complaining party, as indicated
above, or may limit its participation to oral or written submissions.7 6
The panel will typically make findings of fact, a determination as to
the propriety of the contested action under the NAFTA, and recommendations for resolution. 77 The NAFTA provides specific procedures for panel selection to ensure impartiality.7 The five-member
panels are chosen from a trilaterally agreed-upon roster of experts,
including persons from non-NAFTA countries.7 9 The chair of the
panel is selected first, either by agreement of the disputing parties or
by designation of one of the disputing parties who is chosen by lot.80
Each side then selects two panelists who are citizens of the opposing
party or parties."1 The objective of the NAFTA dispute-resolution
procedures is to provide for fair and unbiased review of and recommendation for the resolution of a contested action. Ideally, after receiving the panel's final report and recommendations the disputing
parties will agree on the appropriate resolution of the dispute.8 2 If the
parties are unable to resolve the dispute, the complaining party may
suspend the application of equivalent benefits until the issue is
resolved. 3
The objective underlying the GATT's dispute-resolution procedures is the same as that of the NAFTA. Although the GATT's procedures are quite similar to those under the NAFTA, the GATT
74. NAFTA ch. 20. Chapter 20 provides, "[tihe parties shall at all times endeavor to
agree on the interpretation and application of this Agreement, and shall make every attempt
through cooperation and consultations to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution of any
matter that might affect its operation." Id. ch. 20, art. 2003.
75. Id. ch. 20, art. 2008. Generally, a party may request arbitration if the matter is not
resolved within thirty days of review. Id. ch. 20, art. 2008, § l(a).
76. Id. ch. 20, art. 2008, § 3, ch. 20, art. 2013.

77. Id. ch. 20, arts. 2016, 2017.
78. NAFTA ch. 20, arts. 2009-2011.
79. See id. ch. 20, art. 2009 (providing that members be chosen on basis of objectivity,
reliability, and judgment). Article 2009 does not restrict the roster to nationalists of NAFTA
member countries. See id. ch. 20, art. 2009, § 2(b) (requiring that members be "independent").
Moreover, Article 2011 clearly contemplates the participation of non-NAFTA member nationalists on panels. See id. ch. 20, art. 2011, § 2 (providing for panel selection when more
than two parties in dispute).
80. Id. ch. 20, art. 2011, §§ 1(b), 2(b).
81. Id. ch. 20, art. 2011, §§ 1(c), 2(c).
82. NAFTA ch. 20, art. 2018.
83. Id. ch. 20, art. 2019.
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lacks certain fundamentals necessary to the expedient resolution of
disputes, fundamentals which the drafters of the NAFTA did include.
A recent case brought within the GATT's dispute-resolution parameters serves as an example of dispute resolution under the GATT and
illustrates its shortcomings.
The case has been the source of considerable controversy. 8 4 Mexico
brought this high-profile case under the GATT's procedures to contest United States import prohibitions on certain tuna under the
United States Marine Mammal Protection Act.8" The GATT provides that a complaining party may refer a particular matter to the
contracting parties as a whole if efforts to resolve a complaint between
the parties concerned are unsuccessful.8 6 In actuality, a representative panel is chosen to investigate the complaint. If the parties do not
settle the matter in the interim, the panel makes a report of its findings, recommendations, and rationales.8 7 In this case, the panel determined that the United States tuna embargo constituted an
impermissible quantitative restriction under the GATT and recommended that the United States bring its practices into conformity with
the GATT.8" Since publication of the GATT panel report, Mexico
and the United States have been trying to resolve their disagreement
without further GATT proceedings.8 9 Should current negotiations
between Mexico and the United States be unsuccessful, the only remedy available is the procedure labeled "Nullification or Impairment." 9° This provision allows the contracting parties to authorize a
contracting party to suspend certain concessions or other obligations

84. See EC, Others Pressure US., Mexico to Accept GATT Yellowfin Tuna Report, INT'L
Mar. 20, 1992 (providing brief background of yellowfin tuna
controversy).
85. Id. The United States embargo of Mexican Tuna was prompted by Mexico's use of
purse-seine nets, determined to kill too many dolphins. Id.
ENV'T DAILY (BNA),

86. GATT art. 23.
87. Richard D. English, The Mexican Accession to the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and
Trade, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 339, 361 (1988).
88. GA TT OfficialAssesses Tuna Decision's Impact on Link Between Environment, Trade,
INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA), Oct. 18, 1991. GATT officials emphasized, "a contracting party

cannot unilaterally decide what is best for the international community." Id.
89. EC, Others Pressure US., Mexico to Accept GAT' Yellowfin Tuna Report, INT'L
ENV'T DAILY (BNA), Mar. 20, 1992 (noting Mexican, United States unwillingness to accept
GATT panel's preliminary finding). Both the United States and Mexico have stated that ongoing bilateral talks will best serve to solve the yellowfin tuna dispute. Id.
90. GATT art. 23.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

17

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 24 [2022], No. 3, Art. 3

ST. MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 24:717

under the GATT as the party deems appropriate. 91
In general, the GATT dispute-resolution procedures are not highly
regarded. In fact, the agenda at the Uruguay Round has included
attempting to perfect dispute settlement procedures and creating additional remedies.92 The drafters of the NAFTA attempted to address
the shortcomings of the GATT's dispute-resolution mechanisms, the
most significant of which is the lack of a specific time frame for the
different stages of a dispute. Although the stages for dispute resolution under the NAFTA are similar to those under the GATT, the
NAFTA sets forth three specific time periods for each stage of the
process: (1) the panel must present its initial report within ninety days
of panel selection; (2) the parties must respond to the panel within
fourteen days of receiving the initial report; and (3) the panel must
submit its final report within thirty days of submission of its initial
report.
Perhaps more important is the thirty-day time period, running
from receipt of the panel's final report, within which time the disputing countries must reach agreement as to how to resolve the dispute.
If the countries do not reach agreement within these thirty days or
another, mutually agreed-upon time period, the complaining party
may suspend its obligations to the other party. A specific time period
for resolving the dispute after issuance of the panel's final report puts
pressure on the parties to do so. If this kind of pressure existed under
GATT procedures, the tuna controversy between Mexico and the
United States would likely be resolved today.
V.

CONCLUSION

Mexico has come a long way in its efforts to liberalize trade. Accession to the GATT was the turning point for Mexico's departure from
its protectionist trade policies of the past. This move symbolized
Mexico's commitment to liberalization and modernization. Accession
to the GATT was critical to improving trade relations between Mex91. See id. (allowing for suspension of concessions). This remedy has been employed only
once. See Richard D. English, The Mexican Accession to the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and
Trade, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 339, 360 & n.151 (1988) (discussing Netherlands' imposition of
retaliatory, quantitative restrictions on wheat importation from United States). The reluctance
to use the "Nullification or Impairment" remedy is understandable since the resulting barriers
to trade are contrary to the GATT's goals. Id. at 360-61.
92. See Richard D. English, The Mexican Accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 339, 393 (1988) (listing key topics of Uruguay Round).
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ico and its trading partners, particularly between Mexico and the
United States. Indeed, in 1986, the very year Mexico reapplied to the
GATT, Mexico and the United States embarked on the road towards
the free trade proposed under the initialed NAFTA text. These negotiations led to a series of bilateral trade understandings between the
countries that proved that freer trade could be negotiated, and thus
laid the foundation for the NAFTA.
The probable coexistence of the NAFTA and the GATT raises numerous questions that will be answered in time. Inconsistencies between the two agreements may be brought to light. Nevertheless,
with respect to disputes that may arise between the parties to the
NAFTA, adequate procedures are spelled out in the NAFTA for
their resolution. The NAFTA preserves the applicability of the
GATT's dispute-resolution procedures to disputes arising between
parties to the NAFTA by allowing the complaining party to choose
between the NAFTA and the GATT. This provision reflects the
NAFTA's respect for the multilateral trading system and the belief of
the parties to the NAFTA that regional trading agreements may exist
within the forty-year-old multilateral trading system established by
the GATT.
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